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Abstract 
Walter Benjamin's writings do not owe their intelligibility to their indebtedness to one or more specific 
brands of philosophical thought, but to Benjamin's primary concern with the most elementary distinctions 
of philosophy itself. Chief among these distinctions is that of philosophical thought itself, or the 
difference it makes with respect to the realms of nature, myth, or the appearances. By focusing on the 
notions of "communicability" and "translatability," philosophical difference, for Benjamin, shall be shown to 
rest on structures within the language of man and art that aim at breaking through language's mythical 
interconnectedness, its weblike quality, its textuality, toward the absolute Other of divine language. Yet, 
the fundamental philosophical law not to mix genres or realms, as well as the transcending power of 
philosophical difference, because it remains caught in what it seeks to transgress, are dependent, as far 
as their success is concerned, on the ultimate justification by the (theological) difference of the absolute 
Other of divine language. It is, however, not in the power of philosophy to secure all by itself this 
necessary legitimation. 
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SATURNINE VISION AND THE QUESTION 
OF DIFFERENCE: 
REFLECTIONS ON WALTER BENJAMIN'S 
THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
RODOLPHE GASCHE 
SUNY, Bu a lo 
The history of the criticism to which Benjamin's writings have 
given rise, is the story of many friendships. Whether he has been 
linked up with Hegelian thought, coupled to the theology of the Jewish 
religion of revelation, tied to Romantic linguistic philosophy, paired 
off with historical materialism, or even related to Lutheran theology, 
the critics have primarily sought to appropriate Benjamin's thought 
for their own philosophical viewpoint.' Yet Benjamin, as is well 
known, did not fraternize easily. As reserved as he was, how could he 
have held all those views, or been all those things that critics have 
suggested? Undoubtedly, Benjamin's philosophical allegiances that 
critics have pointed out have significantly contributed to our under- 
standing of this complex author. If Benjamin, as Gershom Scholem 
has insisted time and again, was indeed a philosopher-a 
metaphysician-it ought to be possible, in principle, to assign a 
definite place to his writings in the history of philosophical thought.' 
But can Scholem's characterization of Benjamin as a philosopher 
(and hence the possibility of assigning his affiliation) simply be taken 
for granted? How is one, indeed, to explain the lack in Benjamin's 
writing of almost everything usually associated with the philosophical 
enterprise: a homogenous conceptuality, canonized rules of argumen- 
tation, and reference to the traditional set of problems? Bernd Witte, 
on this basis, has convincingly argued that Benjamin is no philosopher 
at all.' The total disregard in Benjamin for any form of sustained con- 
ceptuality and argumentation, as well as the elitist, esoterical, if not 
idiosyncratic nature of at least Benjamin's early writings-an aspect 
that Witte is so far the only one to have systematically explored-runs 
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counter to the philosophical requirement of transparency and 
systematic exposition of arguments. In addition, what Witte calls 
Benjamin's authoritarian and hypertrophic subjectivism irreducibly 
resists the claim to universality to which philosophy must measure up. 
From this perspective it is ultimately impossible to tie Benjamin to 
any of the philosophical currents that characterized his time. And yet 
he had, undoubtedly, something at stake with philosophy. Until the 
debacle regarding his habilitation dissertation, Benjamin even flirted 
with the idea of becoming a university teacher of philosophy. 
Moreover, most of his work up to that point is obviously of 
philosophical inspiration. In view of this paradoxical situation, rather 
than choosing between Scholem's or Witte's position on Benjamin, 
should one not first explore Benjamin's relation to philosophy in 
general? Instead of trying to discover one more philosophical 
indebtedness that would link this author up with an established brand 
of philosophical thought, it might be appropriate to begin by inquiring 
into the importance that Benjamin gave to philosophy as well as in the 
modalities of such valorization. To do so I will consider some of the 
writings by Benjamin that are commonly referred to as his 
metaphysical and historico-philosophical work; in short, writings of 
that period in his life that stretches from 1915 to 1926. Since during 
those years Benjamin's thought is still in a process of maturing, it is 
difficult to approach this period as a whole. Nevertheless, many 
motifs of a philosophical bearing characterize his writings at that time, 
offering clear testimony to sustained and persistent philosophical con- 
cerns. Benjamin himself suggests such a continuity of views and inter- 
ests when he claims, in a letter to Scholem, that the "Epistemo- 
Critical Prologue" of The Origin of German Ragic Drama not only 
replaces his earlier essay "On Language as Such and the Language of 
Man," but expresses its original intentions perhaps more effec- 
tively.' 
Before analysing some of these persistent motifs in greater detail. 
let me emphasize that, notwithstanding Benjamin's often obscure and 
idiosyncratic writing, the essays and larger works of the period in 
question also reveal considerable philosophical refinement. Such 
subtlety, however, does not consist in technical refinement; rather it 
touches not only on philosophically elementary distinctions, but 
above all, on the difference that philosophical distinction makes in the 
first place. It is my contention that when Benjamin broaches ques- 
tions of philosophy, this concern with the difference philosophy makes 2




is what occupies him primarily. "Fate and Character," is a case in 
point. In this essay, in which the author is primarily concerned with 
establishing a total divergence of both concepts-"Where there is 
character there will, with certainty, not be fate, and in the area of fate 
character will not be found"-Benjamin shows himself fully aware of 
the philosophical implication of such an operation.' Fate, he explains, 
is a connection (Zusammenhang); more precisely it is "a nexus of 
meaning" in which the natural life in man is indiscriminately "coupled 
to cards as to planets" so as to weave a net of embroiling threads 
(Verkettung) in which the possibility of difference is entirely 
liquidated (Reflections, pp. 305, 308). Such non-difference in 
weblike interconnectedness "corresponds to the natural condition of 
the living," or, in other words, to "the demonic stage of human exis- 
tence" we are told (Reflections, pp. 307, 308). Webs of whatever 
sort, because they make difference impossible, are mythical in 
essence. In the essay on Goethe's Elective Affinities, Benjamin notes 
that without difference, all of existence succumbs to the power of na- 
ture and its concept which, free of boundaries, expands monstrously. 
Without a sovereign principle or limits, "the life of myth . . . sets itself 
up as the sole power in the realm of being."6Where character is under- 
stood to be, as is commonly the case, "a network that can be tightened 
by knowledge at will into a dense fabric" made up of "finer and closer 
connections until what looked like a net is tightened into cloth," it can 
then become, as Benjamin remarks, erroneously connected to fate 
(Reflections, p. 309). To make character a function of an em- 
broilment of threads in a weft, is to endow it with the same mythical 
indifference that already distinguishes fate. Character, for Benjamin, 
can be clearly demarcated from fate only if it is defined not by the im- 
mense complexity of a tightly woven cloth, but, on the contrary, by an 
exclusive character trait through which the knots of fate are cut apart. 
If distinguished by "the brilliance of its single traits," character stands 
in radical opposition to the interconnectedness and embroilment of 
fate, causing it to be (in all its forms) "liberating" (Reflections, 
p. 311). The importance that Benjamin attributes throughout his 
writings to the tragic hero is based on a similar principle. By proudly 
recognizing that he is better than the gods with whom he has been 
chained up, this hero instigates a myth-shaking difference by which he 
rises from out of what is termed "the mist of guilt," or in other words, 
from out of the realm of mythical and natural interconnectedness. 
Through this eye-opening insight into man's distinction from the gods, 3
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a difference is made by which boundaries are assigned to myth and 
nature. Benjamin can, therefore, consider the tragic hero as the 
prototype of the philosopher who dispels natural and mythical indif- 
ference in an act of setting himself apart by raising his head higher. 
Distinction and difference are rooted in an act of demarcation by 
which the interlacings of myth are shattered in the name of a radical 
heterogeneity-truth. In his essay on Goethe, Benjamin writes: 
"Genuine art and genuine philosophy-in counterdistinction from 
their nongenuine and theurgical stage-begin in Greece with the end 
of myth, because both rest, one not less, the other not more, on truth" 
(GS, I.1, 162). 
I would like to show in what follows that the concept of dif- 
ference-of a difference that breaks up the continuum of the mythical 
chain-is a persistent concern of Benjamin's thought. But in analysing 
this philosophical motif par excellence-and, it is indeed, through dif- 
ference that philosophy comes into the world-I shall also be able to 
reflect on the limits of philosophy from the perspective of truth that 
Benjamin adopts. From the start, let me emphasize that the act 
through which the tragic hero raises his head above the mythical 
interconnectedness of guilt is not simply a purely mental act of 
abstraction. The difference that he inaugurates, the limits he draws, 
are not the result of pure cognition, meditation, or contemplation, but 
of a hubristic reflection that culminates in self-confident recognition 
that he is better than his gods. The difference that the tragic hero 
brings into the world is rooted in an act of revolt; it is a very practical 
act of cognition. Instead of proceeding through philosophical abstrac- 
tion or reduction, the tragic hero achieves difference by destroying the 
interwoven threads of the mythical web, or, by violently breaking up 
the mythical web of the realm of mere appearance. Difference, in 
short, is based on an act as concrete as a revolt, a violent exhaustion 
(Azdiehrung) or burning up, by what Benjamin will later call "The 
Destructive Character." This difference is thus not simply 
philosophical. As the tragic hero's hubristic act shows, it is artistic 
and religious as well. 
In order to bring Benjamin's treatment of philosophical dif- 
ference more clearly into view, I will briefly consider the essays "On 
Language as Such and the Language of Man," "The Task of the 
Translator," as well as some aspects of the "Epistemo-Critical 
Prologue." From the start it is necessary to emphasize that 
Benjamin's elaborations in the essay on "Language as such" do not 4




fall in any of the traditional philosophical modes of discussing this 
issue. This is of capital importance considering that throughout the 
period of Benjamin's writing that we are concerned with here, the pilot 
science for the coming philosophy he envisioned was to be a theory of 
language. All his developments of language have a double thrust. 
They intend to dismantle both an instrumentalist understanding of 
language-what he calls the bourgeois theory of language-and a 
theory of language that takes the word to be the essence of the thing, or 
in short, what he calls mystical linguistic theory (Reflections, pp. 318, 
324). Roughly speaking, Benjamin distinguishes his own investiga- 
tion of the nature of language from the two views on language as 
discussed in Plato's Cratylos, that is, against the two theories on lan- 
guage that have informed all philosophies of language hitherto. Critics 
such as Winfried Menninghaus have argued that by dismissing as in- 
significant language's utilitarian function, and by inquiring into the 
non-signifying nature of language, Benjamin became a structuralist 
before its time.' Richard Wolin, by contrast, contends that Benjamin's 
criticism of the receptive and cognitive aspects of language is a result 
of a "long-standing Kabbalistic doctrine of language as the divine 
substance of reality."' As I shall argue, Benjamin's theory of lan- 
guage is based neither on insight into the structure of linguistic repre- 
sentation nor on the assumption of a definable divine linguistic 
substance. Benjamin leaves those alternatives behind. 
All language, Benjamin insists, communicates primarily a men- 
tal meaning (geistige lnha he). But, language does not communicate 
such mental content by way of serving as an agency for it. Rather, this 
content is communicated in unmediated fashion in, and not through 
the medium of language. Although this content is communicated in 
language, it does not coincide with the linguistic medium in which it is 
expressed. It is something quite different from that medium. Benjamin 
notes that "the distinction between a mental entity and the linguistic 
entity in which it communicates is the first stage of any linguistic 
theory" (Reflections, p. 315). What, then, is the specific object that 
language communicates? Benjamin writes: "As communication, lan- 
guage communicates a mental entity, i.e.. something communicable 
per se leine Mitteilbarkeit schlechthinl" (Reflections, p. 320). The 
mental content distinct from the linguistic entity in which it is com- 
municated is thus communicability itself. In itself, that is, as an 
expressive medium, language communicates communicability. It is 
the primary content of language, and for Benjamin, the true and sole 5
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object of a philosophical theory of language. Yet apart from a very 
brief reference by Derrida to the issue of communicability in 
Benjamin, not one of the leading Benjamin critics has bothered to shed 
some light on this rather intriguing notion.9 Without its clarification, 
however, Benjamin's theory of language remains necessarily obscure. 
The same must be said of Benjamin's concept of translatability which 
informs his entire theory of translation. It has not to my knowledge 
drawn any attention by Benjamin scholars. 
One might, at first, be tempted to understand communicability as 
simply the (condition of) possibility of communication. Since 
Benjamin also notes, however, that "languages have . . . no speaker," 
and that communicability is communicated, not through but in lan- 
guage, communicability is obviously not a Kantian formal condition 
of possibility (Reflections, p. 316). Its characteristics are not subjec- 
tive. Thus, if communicability is at all to be related to the traditional 
concepts of possibility, it is rather of the order of a real possibility 
(dunamis) of potency in language. As we will see hereafter, it is 
indeed an objective characteristic of language as language. But rather 
than speculating on the status of communicability, let us return to the 
text of "On Language as Such" to clarify this concept's meaning. 
After having established that the mental being which communi- 
cates itself in language is not outwardly identical with the linguistic 
being in which it is expressed, Benjamin remarks: "Mental I geistige 
Wesen I is identical with linguistic being only insofar as it is capable of 
communication I mitteilbarl. What is communicable in a mental entity 
is its linguistic entity." The communicable, consequently, is that part 
of a spiritual being that is linguistic, that part that is expressed in 
unmediated fashion in the spiritual being's communication. What this 
means is that what is being communicated is primarily its language 
itself, language (Sprache) being understood here in a strictly verbal 
sense as relating exclusively to language as act. The communicable 
per se is, thus, language's language, or communicability. This is the 
spiritual content kat'exokhen in language. When Benjamin writes: 
"The answer to the question ' What does language communicate?' is 
therefore 'All language communicates itself,' " he does not con- 
tradict his earlier statement regarding the difference between lan- 
guage as linguistic being and the content expressed in it qua linguistic 
medium. Itself, indeed, designates a "substance" different from the 
specific language in which the communication occurs. This substance 
is language's communication itself, the very act and fact that it speaks. 6




Beyond the Cratylic alternatives of understanding the word as either a 
means to designate things different from it, or as expressing imme- 
diately the essence of things themselves, communicability refers to 
the speech act in the word. This communicability, language's act of 
communication in a verbal sense, is for Benjamin the fundamental 
problem of all philosophy of language. It is the communicable per 
se. 
What I have said up to this point about communicability as the 
object par excellence of the theory of language may seem simply 
trivial. Upon further scrutiny, however, this impression may dissolve 
and the triviality of communicability may reveal itself as similar to 
those essential simplicities with which philosophy is concerned. 
Although communicability has the looks of a philosophical condition 
of possibility, it designates only language's communication itself. 
Why. then, does Benjamin still cast language's communication of 
itself in terms of possibility'? At the beginning of the essay "On Lan- 
guage as Such" Benjamin contends, in order to insinuate at the outset 
that communicability is not simply a philosophical category. "that we 
cannot imagine anything that does not communicate its mental na- 
ture in its expression" ( Reflections, p. 314). A linguistic theory for 
which communicability is the object par excellence, has indeed, as he 
claims, an "intimate connection with the philosophy of religion" 
(Reflections, p. 320). Communicability, understood as language's 
communication of itself as communicating, is, in things. "the residue 
of the creative word of God" ( Reflections, p. 331), and thus oriented 
by the horizon of this divine source. Rather than a category of 
possibility, communicability is constituted by things' yearning to 
relate to the origin of their creation in the Word. In language. in a ver- 
bal sense of their expression, things communicate that they are of di- 
vine origin. It shows them in a process of wanting to communicate, to 
be heard, and redeemed. This then is the point where one can grasp the 
specificity of communicability. It marks the difference it makes to be 
able to speak-a difference that shows everything created to have its 
truth in the divine Word. But such yearning, such intention in Ian 
gunge, is not subjective. Not things yearn to be heard: only that part of 
them that is spiritual, already linguistic-the residue of the creative 
word-does so. Communicability is. thus, an objective ( meta- 
physical) category that designates the difference that expression or 
language makes to the extent that as expression and language it com- 
municates all by itself its difference. Yet language makes such a 7
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difference only by marking itself off against something else. Com- 
municability, consequently, implies a motion of breaking away from. 
of separation. It represents a tendency or intention only to the extent 
that it is a part of a flow that leads away from a given condition. This 
condition is that of the world of appearances (Schein). For Benjamin. 
language is characterized in depth by a tendency of pointing away 
from that realm, thus making a difference. 
In order to understand better this difference-producing function 
of communicability and hence the status of this category itself, I turn 
to "The Task of the Translator." From the start, let me emphasize that 
the law of translation which Benjamin formulates in this essay is as 
objective a law as the one that we have seen determine language's 
expressive function. 
In the same way as communicability indicates a yearning of lan- 
guage to be heard as expressing communication itself, independently 
of all symbolic and utilitarian functions of language, in the same way 
translatability, as an objective category of the work of art, points 
beyond the original itself. Rather than aspiring at a fulfillment of the 
original, translatability indicates the work of art's search for a fulfill- 
ment in something other than the original itself. Translatability, as a 
call in the work of art, calls for a liberation of the work of art from 
itself. Benjamin remarks: "No translation, however good it may be, 
can have any significance as regards the original."" On the contrary, 
a translation implies a displacement, even a disregard of the original's 
sense, as we shall see. The objective possibility of translation, a 
possibility that is also a call for it, can thus best be described as an 
inner limit of the work of art: or in short, as a structural feature that, 
within the work itself, points beyond it. Translatability is the means by 
which the work of art rises above itself, above its own linguistic 
enmeshments. It is an operator of sorts, of difference, and not what 
one could commonly call an essence. 
According to Benjamin, the language of works of art differs from 
that of ordinary language to the extent that it is no longer simply 
referential and intentional. As Benjamin's strong criticism of inten- 
tionality reveals, intentions for him belong to the world of appear- 
ances and phenomena." They are a function of natural and subjec- 
tive ends by which words become chained up with things external. In 
this sense ordinary language is thoroughly natural language since it is 
governed by mythical interconnectedness. While artistic language 
breaks with these natural and, thus, mythical properties of language. 8




the work of art has not for that matter already transgressed all of lan- 
guage's mythical interconnections. Its language is still characterized 
by a certain natural relation between its content and itself, a relation 
that Benjamin describes as forming "a certain unity in the original, 
like fruit and skin" (Illuminations, p. 75). A poet's effort, Benjamin 
reminds us, is directed "solely and immediately at specific linguistic 
contextual aspects 'sprach fiche Gehaltszusammenhange 1." There- 
fore. the work of literature and poetry finds itself still "in the center of 
the language forest linnerer Bergwald der Sprache I" (Illuminations, 
p. 76). As similar images in The Origin (or the Goethe essay) reveal. 
where Benjamin refers to the "wooded interior" of the symbol-a 
reference probably to Baudelaire's poem "Correspondances"-the 
image of the language forest serves to stress the literary works' 
symbolic aspect, which is to say, its being constituted by a natural 
unity based on natural relations between sign and content ( Origin. 
p. 165). Now, translatability represents in the work of art the objec- 
tive call for overcoming this still natural unity rooted in mythical 
linguistic relations. Translatability is, in the work of art, the yearning 
to break the mist of the symbolic relations that constitute it as a 
mythical web-or, a text for short. Translations, if they are to be 
successful, must indeed, achieve this goal. As Benjamin's stress on 
literal, or verbatim translation clearly shows, a translation that 
measures up against a work of art's demand for translation does not 
only disregard content and sense, it destroys the original's structures 
of reference and sense communication as well. Whereas the language 
of the original destroys language's state of being hooked up to 
empirical intentions, a translation destroys the art work's natural 
linguistic unity "with root and branch !mit Stumpf and Stiell" 
(Illuminations, p. 75). It "faces the wooded ridge of language from 
the outside" (Illuminations, p. 76), Benjamin remarks. Because the 
language of translation undoes language's functions and structures for 
imparting sense, and with this all natural linguistic relations, the lan- 
guage of translation stands in a relation of disjunction (Gebrochen- 
heit) to its content (Illuminations, p. 75). It is characterized by broken 
natural or symbolic relations, or to refer to another of Benjamin's 
images, by a relation of discrepancy. Indeed: "While content and lan- 
guage form a certain unity in the original, like a fruit and its skin, the 
language of translation envelops its content like a royal robe with its 
ample folds. For it signifies a more exalted language than its own and 
thus remains unsuited to its content, overpowering and alien." Like 9
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the royal robe, language in translation represents nothing but the 
power of language, language in actu, independently of all content it 
may impart and of the structures that make such communication 
possible. 
Translatability is, in the work of art, that structure that points 
away from its still natural linguistic unity and weblike quality, toward 
language itself. It is. within the artwork's language, the structure 
directed beyond its own symbolic language and its entanglements. "at 
language as such, at its totality," "Intention auf die Sprache als 
solche," says the German text, intention being understood this time in 
a radically nonsubjective and nonempirical fashion." This structure, 
immanent to the language of the original, calls for a departure from 
that language toward pure language-language beyond its utilitarian 
and symbolic functions, beyond the burden of extra-linguistic 
meaning and the structures upon which it rests: which is to say, toward 
the difference that language as language makes. Thanks to this struc- 
ture the work of art raises itself above textual. weblike, and hence 
mythical interconnectedness to communicate that within it, language 
speaks, or that within it, a difference has been set forth. 
Because of its direction (Richtung), a translation is not called 
upon by the original work of art for the sake of that work itself, but 
rather for the benefit of pure, or divine language itself. The difference 
that translatability makes is a difference determined by this objective 
intention toward what Benjamin calls the "afterlife" of the works of 
art, or in short, toward what is thoroughly on the other side of natural 
life and its connections. 
Yet what does this nonphenomenal and pure state of language, at 
which art's demand for translation aims, represent? And what is its 
relation, finally, to the original itself? Translation, Benjamin writes, 
"ultimately serves the purpose of expressing the central reciprocal 
relationship between languages" (Illuminations, p. 72). He con- 
tinues: "Languages are not strangers to one another, but are, a priori 
and apart from all historical relationships, interrelated in what they 
want to express." But languages are not akin to one another as far as 
their words, sentences and linguistic structures are concerned, nor are 
they related through the content that individually they impart: 
Rather, all suprahistorical kinship of languages rests on the inten- 
tions underlying each language as a whole-an intention, 
however, which no simple language can attain by itself but which 10




is realized by the totality of their intentions supplementing each 
other: pure language. While all individual elements of foreign 
languages-words, sentences, structure-are mutually exclu- 
sive, these languages supplement one another in their intentions. 
(Illuminations, p. 74) 
What Benjamin establishes here as "a basic law of a philosophy of 
language," namely, that all singular languages intend one and the 
same thing (eines und :war dasselbe), had already been thematized in 
the earlier essay "On Language as Such" under the name of com- 
municability. The latter stipulated that language, qua language, qua 
linguistic medium, communicates only the unmediated communica- 
tion of its own communicating. And in the same way as this medium- 
related quality presupposes a distancing from language's instrumen- 
tal functions, language's intention toward pure language likewise 
becomes manifest only if languages become thoroughly denatural- 
ized. Such denaturalization of natural language-the task par excel- 
lence of translation-is achieved by translation's focusing not on a 
language's intended objects, but on the mode of its intending, or on 
what the Scholastics called modus significandi-the mode, or inten- 
tion, of meaning (Art des Meinens)." 
By finding in his own language those tendencies or intentions 
toward pure language that transcend its own natural condition, the 
translator produces "in it the echo of the original" (Illuminations, 
p. 73). In this, his enterprise resembles the Adamic naming language 
as described in "On Language as Such." As Benjamin establishes in 
this essay, man can name things only because they communicate their 
expression, their linguistic being to him. What they express is their 
communicability, their each-time-singular intention to communi- 
cate: "Their language passes into man" when man contemplates 
(Anschauen) things and names the singularity of their expression 
(Reflections, p. 329). A name is the proper name, so to speak, of 
things' intention, or mode of signification. In other words, in thus 
calling by their name the each-time-singular mode in which things 
yearn to speak, man completes language as communication in actu, 
by naming it. The name names language's each-time-particular mode 
of communicating. its mode of expression. Hence Benjamin can state 
that the name "is the innermost nature of language itself. Naming is 
that by which nothing beyond it is communicated, and in which lan- 
guage itself communicates itself absolutely. In naming, the mental 11
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entity that communicates itself is language. Where mental being in its 
communication is language itself in its absolute wholeness, only there 
is the name, and only the name is there"( Reflections, p. 318). He can 
conclude, therefore, that "one can call name the language of lan- 
guage (if the genitive refers to the relationship not of a means but of a 
medium )"( Reflections, p. 319). It is of interest to note that Benjamin, 
in "On Language as Such," also calls man's naming language- 
which is both receptive and spontaneous-translation; it is 
"sprachempfangend" to the extent that it listens to "the language of 
things themselves." and independent to the extent that in naming it 
names itself as language (Reflections, p. 325). In short, in translation 
as in naming, the intent to communicate as well as its each-time- 
specific mode of meaning is named, and thus raised to an autonomy of 
its own. 
The "Translator" essay reproduces this same movement of lan- 
guage, a movement that names that which language yearns to com- 
municate, and which does so in setting itself off from all of language's 
natural and mythical qualities. A translation, I have said, focuses on 
what in the original is of the order of intention toward the divine, and 
difference-creating Word (independent of the content intended), and, 
more precisely, on the overall mode of its language as language. In its 
own language it establishes a correspondence to the mode in which the 
original speaks by activating that which in its language breaks with the 
latter's natural condition. A translation, therefore, can be said to be 
"directed at language as such." In philosophical terms, a translation 
seems to be based on what the Scholastics called intentio secunda 
(formalis). Rather than focusing on the object intended in the initial 
intention, translation-but naming as well-cognitively reflects on 
the ens rationis that is the primary act of intending itself (actus 
intellectus reflectus, id est quo aliquid per reflexionem cog- 
noscimus). Indeed, in naming the singular modes in which things 
express themselves, things become known to man: "Only through the 
linguistic being of things can he gain knowledge of them from within 
himself-in name" (Reflections. p. 319). By translating, in the 
original, the intention toward pure language. this intention is also 
reflected upon and made known. In naming as well as in translation, 
communicability and translatability-or the structures within lan- 
guage that yearn for a liberation from its natural and mythical 
interconnectedness and weblike quality-are cognitively appro- 
priated. The name as well as a translation reflect on difference, on the 12




difference which in language itself permits language to overcome its 
own mythical entanglements. 
The reference above to the philosophical issue of intentio secun- 
da is not a reference to one particular philosophical problem. Rather, 
it is a reference to philosophy itself. Philosophy constitutes itself in 
the act of a distancing reflection as a rational entity, different from the 
immediate, from being, etc., and as concerned with exploring and 
assessing its own difference in the attempt to secure its autonomy in 
self-foundation. Naming and translating, because they reflect cogni- 
tively on difference, are of the order of philosophy. Benjamin himself 
makes the connection, at least as far as translation is concerned. The 
"divination and description" of pure, or divine language is, he writes, 
"the only perfection a philosopher can hope for." Yet such pure lan- 
guage, the language of truth, "is concealed in concentrated fashion 
in translation." Translations are therefore not only intrinsically 
philosophical, but "there is (even) a philosophical genius charac- 
terized by a yearning for that language which manifests itself in 
translation" (Illuminations, p. 77). 
But such cognitive reflection of difference as it occurs in the 
Adamic act of naming, in translation, and in the task of the 
philosopher, has its intrinsic limits. Indeed, it does not, for Benjamin, 
escape all mythical predicament. Let me first remark that a transla- 
tion is in principle unable to "possibly reveal or establish" the pure 
language intended by the nonnatural tendencies of artistic language 
(Illuminations, p. 72). Although the translator's task is spurned by 
"the great motif of integrating many tongues into one true language," 
his intention remains "ideational," that is, regulated by this idea in a 
Kantian sense (Illuminations, p. 77). All a translation can hope for is 
to "represent it in embryonic or intensive form Idarstellen, indem sie 
es keimhaft oder intensiv verwirklichtj." The mode of representation 
in question. a mode "of so singular a nature that it is rarely met within 
the sphere of nonlinguistic life"-a mode, by the way, that originates 
in chemistry-allows only for an "intensive-that is, anticipative, 
intimating-realization" of the hidden relationship between the lan- 
guages (Illuminations. p. 72). What is true of translation, that it "is 
only a somewhat provisional way of coming to terms with the foreign- 
ness of languages," since "an instantaneous and final rather than a 
temporary and provisional solution of this foreignness remains out of 
the reach of mankind," is valid for Adamic naming language, and for 
philosophy as well (Illuminations, p. 75). Although man, in "On 13
Gasché: Saturnine Vision and the Question of Difference: Reflections on W
Published by New Prairie Press
82 STCL, Vol. 1I, No. / (Fall, 1986) 
Language as Such," is shown to be "the speaker of language" since 
"he speaks in name," this only "vouches for the fact that language as 
such is the mental being of man," and not, for the one realizing lan- 
guage as such in naming, the divine word (Reflections, pp. 318-19). 
Adam's naming language, which answers things' language, is, 
notwithstanding its importance, only one moment of "the un- 
interrupted flow of . . . communication [that' runs through the whole 
of nature from the lowest forms of existence to man and from man to 
God" (Reflections, p. 331). Philosophy too, and its thought of dif- 
ference, is only one rung on the ladder that leads to what Benjamin 
terms doctrine (Lehre), which is concerned with the Divine, or pure 
difference itself. " 
As Benjamin knew very well, the translation by name of the dif- 
ference that things communicate to man in their expression, as well as 
a translation's articulation of what in the original's language hints at 
the hidden kinship of languages, establishes a community between 
two spheres that needs an ultimate grounding in a higher sphere. 
However perfect the language may be into which the less perfect lan- 
guage is translated, "the objectivity of this translation" must be 
"guaranteed by God," he reminds us (Reflections, p. 325). Indeed, as 
Benjamin argues in "On Language as Such," it is only because the di- 
vine word created things, which thus contain as a residue "the germ of 
the cognizing name," that man can name things in the first place 
(Reflections, p. 325). Benjamin demonstrates a fine philosophical 
sensitivity when he declares that the task by man of naming things 
"would be insoluble were not the name-language of man and the 
nameless one of things related in God and released from the same 
creative word, which in things became the communication of matter in 
magic communion, and in man the language of knowledge and name 
in blissful mind" (Reflections, p. 326). For naming and translation to 
be possible, a prior "identity of the creative word and the cognizing 
name in God" must, indeed, be assumed. The identity of the creative 
and at once cognizing divine word-this ultimate community-is the 
condition of possibility of all expression and all naming, or transla- 
tion. 
In his "Program of the Coming Philosophy," where Benjamin 
takes in the name of a unitarian approach to the question of the 
ultimate ground, a critical stand against the Kantian division 
between epistemology and metaphysics, or in short, between criticism 
and dogmatic philosophy, he already severely criticized the 14




Kantian philosophical notions of experience and cognition. Yet, the 
metaphysics aimed at in this essay still envisioned the possibility of a 
higher form of specifically philosophical cognition and experience in 
which the "absolute, as existence," God for short, could be encoun- 
tered in unmediated fashion." Although such concepts of experience 
and cognition already turn philosophy into the doctrine of religion 
with its immediate absolute certainty of the absolute, Benjamin con- 
tinued to think the latter as cognitively apprehensible in systematic 
unity. But by the time of his later work, The Origin, Benjamin had 
given up the hope that mere thought could think and conceptually 
come to grips with the fundamental identity and unity of the ultimate 
ground. In the Goethe essay, Benjamin already established that the 
unity of philosophy, its system, is in no way within the reach of 
philosophical questioning ( GS, 1.1,172-73). Truth, he states in "The 
Epistemo-Critical Prologue," "is devoid of all intention, and cer- 
tainly does not itself appear as intention. Truth does not enter into 
relationships, particularly intentional ones." Its mode of existence is 
that of "an intentionless state of being." The prior identity that, as 
seen, must underlie both poles of a translation process, can no longer 
be approached philosophically since, as he writes, "truth is the death 
of intention" ( Origin, pp. 35-36). All attempts to come to grips with it 
cognitively, by attempting to ensnare truth in the "spider's web" of 
thought "as if it were something which came flying in from outside," 
show philosophy still to be in the grips of myth ( Origin, p. 28). Cogni- 
tion is still intentional and relational, and thus mediated by natural 
desires and ends. Benjamin writes: "Knowledge is possession. Its 
very object is determined by the fact that it must be taken possession 
of-even if in a transcendental sense-in the consciousness"( Origin, 
p. 29). Knowledge, because it is reflective, is still a function of natural 
subjectivity. The systems it weaves, and in which everything becomes 
linked to the subject, are mythic webs that allow for no difference. 
The Adamic naming gesture, the task of the translator and of the 
philosopher as well, are thus limited to being moments in a higher 
scheme because naming, translating or reflecting difference pre- 
supposes an underlying prior unity which they themselves cannot 
hope to bring about. But it is not so much because of their status of 
being moments that all three orders are limited; it is, rather, the fact 
that they are still cognitive, and hence fundamentally incapable of 
truly setting difference free. 
Truth, or the prior identity, not only escapes the reach of 15
Gasché: Saturnine Vision and the Question of Difference: Reflections on W
Published by New Prairie Press
84 STCL, Vol. 11, No. I (Fall, 1986) 
cognitive appropriation, it also does not relate intentionally to what it 
embraces, itself included. It does not relate to itself in a relational 
manner, since all such relation would, according to Benjamin, still be 
mythical. For the same reason, truth is not of the order of intentio 
recta, the intention of intention, nor for that matter, the language of 
language. The reflexivity characteristic of intentio recta only distin- 
guishes man's naming language, as well as the status of translation 
and philosophy, each of which are mere moments in the flow of com- 
munication of difference that runs through all of creation toward 
God. 
Although naming, translating, and philosophizing are consti- 
tuted by the telos of the creative word and the hidden kinship of lan- 
guages, they cannot by themselves bring that unity about, or cognize 
it. In spite of the fact that communicability and translatability point 
away from the mythic web of language toward the difference of non- 
phenomenal "Otherness," the philosophical activity of naming and 
reflecting these difference-producing tendencies remains caught up in 
what it yearns to transgress. In other words, the structures of 
transcending immanent to language, the structures that create dif- 
ference by pointing away from language's empirical and mythical en- 
tanglement such as translatability and communicability, are unable to 
achieve the pure difference that they aim at and presuppose. However 
decisive the transcending power of the linguistically immanent struc- 
tures of difference may be, they remain finite. They are not different 
enough, not as radically different as an absolute ground, by right, 
ought to be. Their transcending and difference-creating power, as well 
as the objectivity of these structures, are themselves in want of an ulti- 
mate justification and legitimation by the absolute Otherness of truth. 
But they cannot hope to bring this sanctioning about on their own 
terms. It is a legitimation that only truth itself can, in its own time and 
on its own terms, grant. And since truth is not relational, intentional. 
or based on reflection, such granting cannot, for Benjamin, be of the 
order of the modes of grounding available to philosophy, such as 
legitimation or justification. Since Benjamin conceives of truth as 
radically different, and in total disjunction from that of which it might 
be the truth, such demand for grounding by the structures of dif- 
ference that are communicability and translatability can only take 
place through their radical Erlosung, or release from the prisonhouse 
of language. 
Communicability and translatability, as seen, come closest to 16




being philosophical concepts of difference. But this proximity is also 
that which for Benjamin constitutes their limit. They are still 
epistemological concepts of difference, and in want of a redeeming 
relation to truth which thought is unable to provide. The difference 
from the embroilments and enmeshments of nature and myth they 
achieve, however decisive it may be, is not yet radical. The dif- 
ference-producing thrust of these structures depends, as to their 
possibility and effect, on a difference so radical that it escapes the 
spider web of thought. Philosophical difference, for Benjamin, is thus 
a function of a difference that escapes its grasp, but a difference that it 
must nonetheless presuppose, even though by itself it is unable to 
secure this difference's legitimizing function. Because of these limits 
of philosophy, to truly disrupt the threads that make up the tightly 
woven web of myth by establishing a difference that would escape 
the empirical and the subjective, and that would be fully objective (or 
rather, because of philosophy's limitations in immanently and 
singularly securing the transcending thrust of the difference which 
philosophical difference makes with respect to and at the level of 
myth, the empirical, and the aesthetic), philosophy itself must call for 
legitimation by a higher instance, namely, by the doctrine of truth. Yet 
it is not in the power of philosophy to secure for itself an answer to its 
pledge. 
Whether this inability of the philosophical concepts of dif- 
ference to secure their own legitimation truly implies an irreducible 
relation of philosophy in general to theological concepts, as Benjamin 
seems to suggest, or whether such a problematic is not rather a func- 
tion of a lack of an ability on Benjamin's part, to sound the intellectual 
possibilities of philosophy, along with a perhaps too-narrow Kantian 
concept of philosophy as criticism, are questions I cannot hope to 
solve here. What, by contrast, I can try to show is that the flaws of the 
philosophical concepts of difference are not, for Benjamin, simply 
shortcomings. Indeed, their finite nature contains paradoxically, not 
the promise, but the possibility of a chance that they might truly strike 
a difference. To show that this is the case, I shall return once again to 
the internal limits of the structures of difference that I discussed. 
It is not in the power of these structures, however objective they 
might already be, to break away once and for all from the empirical 
and aesthetic web of language toward divine language. All they 
achieve is a caesura in the realm of mythical entanglement. A 
caesura, Benjamin tells us, does not lead to a complete separation of 17
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what it divides; as an instance of critical power a caesura only 
prevents the parts and levels in question from becoming mixed (GS, 
1.1, 181-82). A caesura keeps them simultaneously together and 
separate. Benjamin illustrates such caesura! difference when 
discussing the relation of a translation to the sense of the original, with 
the following simile: "Just as a tangent touches a circle lightly 
1,17Uchtigil and at but one point, with this touch rather than with the 
point setting the law according to which it is to continue on its straight 
path to infinity, a translation touches the original lightly and only at 
the infinitely small point of sense, thereupon pursuing its own course 
according to the laws of fidelity in the freedom of linguistic flux" 
(Illuminations, p. 80). In order for a translation to correspond to the 
demand for translation in the original, it must disregard, or rather. 
touch the original's sense in such a manner that a movement away 
from sense is inaugurated. The disregard of sense must not be abso- 
lute; such difference in translation would be abstract, false, erring dif- 
ference. True philosophical difference is achieved in the fleeting touch 
of what is to be disregarded, in fidelity to what is to be abandoned. 
A caesura thus seems to yield to the philosophical demand par 
excellence-that genres as different as the universal and the particu- 
lar, the empirical and the transcendental are not to be mixed-of 
which Benjamin has shown himself fully aware in his criticism of 
Friedrich Schlegel's attempt to conceive of the unity of art (first, 
thought as an idea in the Platonic sense as proteron to physei) as itself 
a concrete work of art (GS, 1.1, 90). But the difference between that 
philosophical law itself and Benjamin's use of it is rather striking. For 
Benjamin, the universal or transcendental is not, as seen, a given or 
something that could be thought in its unity, and that could thus be 
clearly marked off against the empirical or the particular. Benjamin's 
concept of difference is based on the assumption that the radically dif- 
fering pole of philosophical difference or opposition is not at hand. In 
lack of the radical and non-phenomenal Other, all that thought can do 
is touch on what is in order to move away from it. In this motion alone, 
in a differing in an active sense, can the Other, truth or originary dif- 
ference be anticipated. Benjaminian difference, as it is formulated in 
such concepts as communicability and translatability, is thus a dif- 
ference that realizes in perhaps a fundamental way the philosophical 
demand not to mix genres. By fleetingly touching in a disrupting 
movement away the webs of language that allow for no difference, 18




difference is produced in the first place, and with it, the empty space of 
the Other of myth. Although the difference thus created does not 
imply clearly divided realms (nor a constituted Other), it anticipates 
the possibility of the radical Otherness of truth whose thinking does 
not fall into the powers of man. 
In short, the difference with respect to the interlacings of lan- 
guage in the grips of myth and nature, which Benjamin seeks to con- 
ceptualize, is a difference not between already constituted poles or 
realms. Still, the philosophical requirement not to mix remains a 
must, or better, becomes even more pressing since in the mythical 
absence of difference the demand not to mix turns into the more funda- 
mental demand for difference in the first place. Benjamin's concept of 
difference inscribes in itself the impossibility to immanently distin- 
guish between the profane webs of language and its total Other; but the 
demand for difference becomes, then, all the more urgent. In the 
absence of the total Other-"Other" to a point that it must necessarily 
be absent from the mythical webs of language if it is to truly make a dif- 
ference-of an Other so beyond man's finitude and his natural condi- 
tion that it can only be termed the sacred, the fleeting touch that 
touches to break away is the sole means to instigate difference. This 
finite difference, however, points at the radical difference that alone 
can make it meaningful, and that alone can grant significance to the 
fundamental philosophical law not to mix. 
As mentioned, from a philosophical viewpoint, commu- 
nicability and translatability are finite concepts of transcending and 
difference. As such they might seem to mix the incommensurable 
dimensions of the universal and the particular. But that is not so since 
Benjamin's notion of language-and not unlike Kant's notion of the 
sublime which only negatively represents the realm of the ideas- 
refers to that same realm by violently destroying language's aesthetic 
and structural characteristics. In this manner, communicability and 
translatability precisely avoid mixing domains. In the same way that 
reference in aesthetic considerations to theological concepts does not 
only imply no metabasis eis alto genos, as Benjamin remarks in The 
Origin, but serves instead to demarcate levels in the first place so that 
the theoretical paradoxes which distinguish these considerations can 
be solved, the finite concepts of difference, rather than implying an 
illegitimate confusion of levels of thought, secure their distinction by 
likewise representing (darstellen), that which pertains to "the higher 19
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domain of theology," in the very destruction of the networks of lan- 
guage (Origin, p. 216). Such destruction, as said, makes the dif- 
ference. 
This concept of difference, then, is not simply a philosophical 
concept. Benjamin agrees with Kant that reference to the absolute 
ground as absolutely Other is inevitable. He also agrees with this 
same philosopher that such a ground cannot in its difference from 
objects of nature, be known. Thought cannot hope to conceptualize it, 
or realize it in consciousness. Yet Benjamin refuses, not only in 
"Program of the Coming Philosophy," but throughout his writings, to 
go along with Kant's injunction to keep criticism and metaphysics 
separate. For Benjamin to conflate both realms is not to indulge in 
empiricism, or what amounts to the same, in the leveling daemonic 
forces of myth; on the contrary, such conflation serves only to realize 
difference in the first place. Benjamin proceeds from the assumption 
that actual reference by (critical) philosophy to the higher domain of 
the ground is that which endows philosophy with its distinguishing 
trait. Although it cannot think the ground, it actually anticipates it in 
the existent. In that sense critical philosophy is for him always already 
theology, but not theology, of course, in a positive sense. Benjamin's 
concept of difference is not only not a pure philosophical concept 
inasmuch as it implies actual reference to "the higher domain of 
theology"; neither is it a purely theological concept since what has 
been established regarding philosophy as a cognitive undertaking is 
valid of theology as a positive discipline as well. 
Benjamin's thought of difference cannot be cast in terms of any 
particular philosophy, and can thus not be appropriated for any 
particular brand of thought. The paradoxical nature of his intellectual 
enterprise, permitting multiple appropriations, may well stem fiom, 
on the one hand, his seemingly unconditional acceptance of the 
Kantian concept of philosophy while refusing at the same time to yield 
to the Kantian requirement of distinguishing the critical and the 
dogmatic without, on the other hand, opting for a Hegelian solution of 
that difference (and in this sense Benjamin is also very much like 
Kierkegaard). But Benjamin seems to be specifically concerned with 
the fundamental question of how philosophy in general is to make a 
difference. Reference in philosophy to the "higher domain of 
theology" seems, for Benjamin, to make such difference possible. But 
at the same time, this constitutive reference to the absolute Other of 
myth and the entanglements of language is also what strikes, with 20




irreducible finitude, philosophy's attempt to raise itself above the web 
of language. Or rather. it causes such attempt to become utterly 
idiosyncratic. 
For such a position as the one outlined, a position based on a ten- 
sion between philosophy and theology, there is, it seems to me, a name 
in Benjamin's writings. In The Origin it is called "saturnine vision" 
(p. 179). Such vision, or theoretical glance, realizes reference to the 
Absolute, to that which is completely separated from the 
embroilments of myth and the mythical interconnectedness of lan- 
guage, not through cognitive abstraction, but in "close touch" with 
what is, namely, by violently tearing its texture to shreds. This vi- 
sion's transcending glance reaches only beyond the realm of intercon- 
nectedness to the extent that it stands under the sign of the natural 
powers and their mythical embroilments that it seeks to overcome. 
Saturn is the sign under which Benjamin was born." The daemonic 
powers that it symbolizes are such that they limit any order of exis- 
tence to and within the plane of the profane and temporal. Yet, the 
infinitely small crack or the almost insignificant disruption that such 
vision under the sign of the most earthy planets produces in the tightly 
woven web of the daemonic forces of fate is, because it is (as opposed 
to merely phenomenal and cognitive nondifference), anticipatory of 
the being of the ideas-or to use another of Benjamin's expressions, of 
the "indivisible unity." or, rather, as the German original puts it, "the 
crackless (sprunglose) unity of truth" (Origin. p. 33). 
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